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Humans expect generosity
Pablo Brañas-Garza1, Ismael Rodríguez-Lara1 & Angel Sánchez2,3,4
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One 
psychological feature likely to be relevant is the formation of expectations, particularly about receiving 
cooperative or generous behavior from others. Without such expectations, social life wil be seriously 
impeded and, in turn, expectations leading to satisfactory interactions can become norms and 
institutionalize cooperation. In this paper, we assess people’s expectations of generosity in a series of 
controled experiments using the dictator game. Despite diferences in respective roles, involvement 
in the game, degree of social distance or variation of stakes, the results are conclusive: subjects 
seldom predict that dictators wil behave selishly (by choosing the Nash equilibrium action, namely 
giving nothing). The majority of subjects expect that dictators wil choose the equal split. This implies 
that generous behavior is not only observed in the lab, but also expected by subjects. In addition, 
expectations are accurate, matching closely the donations observed and showing that as a society we 
have a good grasp of how we interact. Finaly, correlation between expectations and actual behavior 
suggests that expectations can be an important ingredient of generous or cooperative behavior.
Humans are one of the four pinnacles of social evolution along with colonial invertebrates, social insects 
and nonhuman mammals1,2. Recent research points to psychological mechanisms, evolved to support our 
ultra-cooperative lifestyle, as the basis for human ultra-sociality3,4. Prominent among such mechanisms is that 
interaction with others sets up expectations. Expectations indeed grease the wheels of social integration. When 
facing others in a social context, we do not suppose that they wil behave randomly, but rather we believe their 
actions wil conform to our expectations for that context. In particular, expectations are deeply intertwined with 
cooperative and generous behavior: hus, we expect dedication and care (beyond the pure delivery of services), 
for instance, when we visit the doctor or when we ask for advice in a shop. Crucialy, this is also true of people 
whom we meet for the irst time: without this sort of wishful thinking, we would probably not travel abroad, since 
there is always a risk of geting sick or needing help in diferent ways among strangers.
Besides afecting the emergence of social norms5,6 or the level of happiness7–9, expectations turn out to be 
crucial in many economic environments. hey are associated with herding behavior10, decisions to trust in the 
investment game11, strategic thinking12–14, cooperation in social dilemmas15,16, ultimatum bargaining17 and many 
others. At the organizational level, employees’ expectations might afect their decisions on giving up their cur-
rent job or accepting a particular ofer, as expectations about peers’ performance inluence their level of efort18. 
Expectations are indeed a wel rooted concept in the seting of incomplete contracts, i.e., contracts that for several 
reasons fail to specify investment levels properly, or other contingencies. hese type of relations can only work if 
the parties trust in the other’s performance19. Not surprinsingly, expectations have been taken as a reference point 
in many behavioral models20–24. However, litle is known about people’s expectations of being treated generously 
and how such expectations relate to actual generous behavior.
In this paper we aim to answering the above questions by means of a comprehensive exploration of subjects’ 
expectations about generosity. An appropriate manner to study expectations in generosity is the dictator game 
(DG for short), which has provided a large body experimental evidence on altruistic behaviour in the lab during 
the last thirty years25,26. he DG is a simple one-shot game with two players: the irst one (the dictator) is invited 
to divide a speciied amount between himself and the second player (the recipient). he dictator may divide the 
pie in the manner he sees it, while the recipient is not permited to make any claim to the money. heoreticaly, 
self-centered preferences predict that the dictator keeps al the pie and the recipient receives nothing; hence, 
any positive donation can be interpreted as proof of generosity. Contrary to the self-centered prediction, Engel’s 
meta-analysis25 shows that a huge number of individuals do ofer nonzero, oten sizeable portions of the pie to 
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the recipient. On average, subjects donate between 20–30% of the total pie with a non-trivial fraction of subjects 
choosing an equal split. Interestingly, some authors argue that this is indeed a lower bound for generosity given 
the absence of social context within a lab experiment26–31.
Our speciic goal here is to study if subjects expect this generous behavior in one-shot interactions, i.e., exclud-
ing any possible reciprocity efects32,33. Our study investigates also the accuracy of expectations; i.e., whether 
or not expectations are in line with the observed behavior. Previous research has focused on the relationship 
between the dictator’s expectations and his own behavior34–36 or the role of gender in expectations37. In order to 
provide a truly general insight on expectations of generosity, it is important to study as many relevant factors as 
possible. Towards this goal, we have designed and carried out a set of experiments in which subjects have to guess 
the donation that a dictator has already given in a DG. We cover a wide range of conditions by varying the degree 
of involvement, the social distance, the role of the guesser, the possibility of hedging, the size of the stake or the 
location of the experiment. Although these elements have been found to afect donations in a DG25–31,38, there is 
yet no systematic investigation of how they could possibly inluence expectations about generosity.
Our research questions and their corresponding experimental conditions are summarized in Table 1 (see 
the Methods for a ful description of the corresponding experimental setups). Our elicitation covers subjects’ 
expectations about the donation they expect to receive (with the usual or higher stakes), the donations others are 
going to receive (lack of involvement in the outcome), and the donations from absent dictators or from dictators 
from a previous experiment (thus probing the efects of social distance between subjects). Al choices are incen-
tivized (subjects receive monetary payments according to the accuracy of their predictions). To avoid hedging, we 
Question Condition
1 Do experimental subjects in the lab expect selish behavior? Recipient guessing the donation she is going to receive in a lab experiment
2 Do experimental subjects in the lab expect selish behavior when they are not involved in the outcome?
Recipient guessing the donation other recipient is going to receive 
in a lab experiment
3 Do experimental subjects (in the ield) expect selish behavior in the presence of high stakes?
Recipient guessing the donation she is going to receive in a ield 
experiment with high incentives
4 Do experimental subjects in the lab expect selish behavior when dictators are absent?
Recipient guessing the donation she is going to receive from an 
absent dictator
5 Do experimental subjects in the lab expect selish behavior when they are just observers?
A third party (observer) guessing the donation that a recipient has 
received in a previous experiment
6 Do experimental subjects in the lab expect selish behavior ater they divided the pie? A dictator guesing the donation of other dictator
Table 1.  Summary of questions addressed in this study and the corresponding experimental conditions. 
Note: Subjects have to guess the dictator’s donation in the DG. Across conditions, we vary the degree of 
involvement, the social distance, the role of the guesser, the possibility of hedging, the size of the stake or the 
location of the experiment. We can therefore assess how these features afect expectations about generosity in 
one-shot interaction with strangers.
Figure 1. Distribution of guesses aggregated over al experimental conditions (255 observations). Subjects 
seldom predicts selishness (in blue). he modal expectation (in orange) is hyper-fair behavior, i.e., an equal 
split of the pot. A total of 25 guesses (10%) correspond to selish behavior while 87 guesses (34%) correspond to 
the equal split.
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consider a condition in which external observers do not receive the dictator’s donation, but are paid the show-up 
fee plus an additional amount for their correct guesses39. Finaly, we also asked dictators to guess the donations of 
other dictators, and hence there is possible inluence of one’s own choice in the answer.
Results
he main result of our study is that the majority of people expect generous behavior with the modal prediction 
being the hyper-fair outcome; i.e., the equal split. Figure 1, aggregates results for al six conditions studied, and 
Fig. 2 shows the distribution of guesses for each condition along with the mean and median expectation in each 
condition. It is very clear from the plots that, both in the aggregate and across conditions, subjects expect not only 
generosity (meaning positive donations), but large positive donations close to hyper-fair behavior from dictators, 
and that the distribution of guesses is roughly the same in al cases. It is remarkable that the largest fraction of 
subjects expect the equal split. Interestingly, a signiicant fraction of subjects expect a donation of 4, which is the 
Figure 2. Distribution of guesses across conditions. Hyper-fair behavior (50–50) is the modal expectation (in 
orange) across conditions; pure selish behavior (in blue) is barely predicted. here are no signiicant diferences 
across conditions.
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median in al the conditions except Condition 5 (observer guessing a previous donation). Overal, 60% expect a 
donation of 4 or more, which is a large majority. As regards strictly selish behavior, we observe that it is predicted 
by roughly 10–15% of subjects, with the exception of condition 2, where the recipient has to make a prediction 
about another dictator: in this condition, none of our subjects predicted 0. On the other hand, subjects seldom 
predict donations above the equal split. However, in every condition -except condition 1, guessing what one is 
going to receive— there is at least one subject who predicts ful donation.
When we look at the factors that may afect expectations, the Kruskal-Walis test cannot reject the nul 
hypothesis that al guesses come from the same distribution at any common signiicance level, under difer-
ent assumptions (p > 0.173). Pairwise comparisons conirm that there are not signiicant diferences between 
Figure 3. Expectations and observed behavior across conditions. Cumulative distribution of guesses (red 
lines) and dictators’ donations (blue lines) in each condition. Expectations are very accurate, in particular in 
conditions 1, 2, 5 and 6.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
SCIEnTIfIC RePORtS | 7:42446 | DOI: 10.1038/srep42446 5
the underlying distributions of any two conditions (p > 0.305) (see Table S1 and the discussion in the 
Supplementary Information).
An econometric analysis conirms that generous behavior is expected regardless of the location, the degree of 
involvement in the outcome, the social distance or the size of the stakes. Table 2 reports the estimates of four dif-
ferent speciications that atempt to predict what subjects expect that dictators wil donate. hese speciications are 
frequently used to model the dictator’s behavior25. We irst considered an OLS regression, but because donations 
cannot be smaler than 0 or larger than 10 (cf. Figs 1 and 2), one may argue that the data are censored. In that case, we 
included a Tobit model as it may be more appropriate. Subsequently, we studied a hurdle model, that also accounts 
for the “spike” in the zero donation, but assumes that the forces afecting the wilingness to guess a positive donation 
may difer from the ones that determine what subjects expect dictators to donate. Such a hurdle speciication there-
fore assumes that subjects have to decide whether to guess any donation at al with a logit model (Hurdle0), and only 
then the process determining the positive guessing applies (Hurdle+ ). In line with our discussion so far, guesses are 
found to be consistent across conditions, as none of the dummy variables are signiicantly diferent from zero. As 
can be seen from the Table 2, for OLS and Tobit models, the value of the constant is signiicantly diferent from zero, 
which indicates that subjects expect a positive donation from the dictator. he negative (and signiicant) value of the 
constant in Hurdle0 can be interpreted as subjects not being likely to predict the zero donation.
Next, we analyze the accuracy of expectations by comparing the elicited beliefs with the actual donation of 
dictators. Figure 3 presents our data using the cumulative distribution of guesses and donations in each condition. 
Subjects turn out to be quite accurate in their predictions in Conditions 1, 2, 5 and 6, where we ind no signiicant 
diference between the expected behavior and actual donations (p > 0.130). In the presence of high incentives 
(condition 3) or when dictators are absent (condition 4), recipients tend to overestimate the amount they are 
going to receive from dictators (p < 0.01). As we have discussed above, expectations are the same in al conditions. 
Hence these disagreements arise from the fact that dictators are more selish in conditions 3 and 4 (see Fig. S1 in 
the Supplementary Information). his is in line with previous evidence suggesting that dictators donate less in the 
presence of high stakes25,26,38 or when there is no direct contact between dictators and recipients27–29.
Finaly, we look into the relationship between a subject’s behavior and her own expectation. Our data from 
condition 6 (where dictators’ expectations about others’ donations were elicited) provide us with the results 
depicted in Fig. 4. We observe a clear correlation between the dictators’ donations and their beliefs about how 
other dictators would behave (r2 = 0.28, p = 0.046; when restricted to positive donations only, r2 = 0.40, p = 0.005). 
OLS (1) Tobit (2)  Hurdle0 (3) Hurdle+ (4)
C2 (Other dictators)  0.620 (0.41)  0.717 (0.44) 0.102 (0.42)
C3 (Field) 0.743 (0.48)  0.747 (0.53)  0.077 (0.77)  0.355 (0.50)
C4 (Absent dictator)  0.526 (0.49)  0.489 (0.53)  0.448 (0.72)  0.342 (0.52)
C5 (Observer) − 0.300 (0.41) − 0.368 (0.45) 0.539 (0.61) − 0.037 (0.44)
C6 (Dictator) 0.320 (0.29)  0.325 (0.31)  0.000 (0.47)  0.149 (0.31)
Constant 3.400** (0.29)  3.303** (0.32) − 2.197** (0.47) − 0.499 (0.31)
n 255 255 205 230
Table 2.  Econometric results for guesses about the dictator’s donation. Note: Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. he hurdle model considers 205 observations because recipients never predict that other 
dictators wil donate zero; i.e., Condition 2 is not taken into account in the analysis. Hurdle+ relies on the 230 
observations that correspond to positive guesses. Signiicance at the *5%, **1% level. We observe that subjects 
expect for dictators to donate a positive amount. here are no diferences across conditions therefore the degree 
of involvement, the social distance, the role of the stakes do not inluence the degree of expected generosity.
Figure 4. Within-subjects analysis of expections and own behavior (Condition 6). Experimental subjects’ 
behavior is correlated with their expectations about others’ donations. he size of the circles is proportional to 
the number of subjects with a given belief and behavior.
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he fact that half of dictators donated an amount equal to their belief highlights the deep connection between 
expectations and behavior34–36. On the other hand, 20% (30%) of subjects expected less (more) than their own 
donation, as can be observed from the circles above (below) the diagonal in Fig. 4.
Discussion
In summary, our series of experiments strongly supports the conclusion that subjects expect generous behavior 
in situations, such as those modeled by the DG, where self-interest should be the rule. Our indings are derived 
in one-shot games, i.e., in the absence of any expectations of reciprocity. his is a clear indication that humans 
expect other humans to behave socialy. Importantly, expectations are wel connected to the degree of generosity 
and are not afected by the degree of involvement, the social distance, the possibility of hedging, the size of the 
stake or the location of the experiment.
We believe that our results are related to the experimental evidence showing that cooperation might be the 
default option for a large fraction of the population40–42. Indeed, in one-shot or in the irst round of iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma or Public Good games approximately half of the subjects cooperate43. Remarkably, the frac-
tion of people is very similar to the fraction of subjects expecting hyper-fair ofers in our experiments. Current 
evidence suggests that cooperative choices are correlated with generosity44,45. We have seen that expectations 
about generosity are also correlated with generous behaviour, what might indicate a common prosocial motiva-
tion towards cooperation.
he indings we have reported suggest an important direction for future work, namely whether expectations 
in one game (or strategic situation, generaly speaking) carry over to a diferent one. Recent experiments by 
Peysakhovich et al.46 suggest a sizable fraction of the population may exhibit a ‘cooperative phenotype’, leading 
them to make prosocial decisions across games. Studying the relationship between expectations and these phe-
notypes is likely to lead to a breakthrough in the understanding of cooperation and, above al, in providing solid 
indications as to how to promote prosocial behavior.
From a broader perspective, the so-caled Neo-Darwinian theory47 suggests that altruism may be detrimental 
as it reduces the one’s itness while enhancing the itness of others. Arguably, altruism may have positive efects 
from an evolutionary viewpoint, as human beings are characterized by bounded rationality and may learn from 
other individuals what is good for them48,49. While there might be diferent mechanisms to sustain altruism and 
cooperative behaviour (e.g., punishment15,50,51), we argue that expectations might be another important factor 
driving altruism and social norms. Fair behavior might be wel-internalized and thus becomes the de facto rule, 
which is then relected in subject expectations and leads to generous behavior. Key for this mechanism to work 
is the accuracy of the beliefs held, as we have seen we are able as a society to have a clear idea of what to expect 
from others. Recent indings highlight that subjects keep believing in prosocial behaviour in repeated contexts, 
even when cooperation efectively decreases52. Further research on the connection between expectations and own 
behavior (including the possibility of a casual relationship between the two), on the existence and characteristic of 
cooperative phenotypes, and on the accuracy of expectations is needed to shed light on these issues.
Methods
his section explains the diferent conditions used along this research, the research questions and the experi-
mental procedures folowed in each stage. An English translation of the instructions used in the experiments 
are included in the Supplementary Information. he data comes from 205 subjects who made a total of 255 
(incentivized) guesses about the dictator’s donation (note that 50 subjects made two guesses as they participated 
in conditions 1 and 2).
An informed consent form was signed by al subjects taking part in the experiment. Anonymity was always 
preserved (in agreement with Spanish Law 15/1999 on Personal Data Protection) by randomly assigning 
a numerical code to identify the participants in the system. No association was ever made between their real 
names/addresses and the results. As is standard in socio-economic experiments, no ethic concerns are involved 
other than preserving the anonymity of participants. his procedure was checked and approved by the Vice-dean 
of Research of the School of Economics of the University of Granada; the institution hosting the experiments. Al 
methods were performed in accordance with the relevant guidelines and regulations.
Conditions 1–2: Recipients in the lab guessing own and others’ donations. A total of 100 subjects, 
al of them undergraduate students from ields other than Economics and Business, reporting no previous expe-
rience in experiments, participated in an experiment at the Laboratory for Research in Experimental Economics 
(LINEEX), University of Valencia, in February 2013. he experiment was conducted using the z-Tree sotware53. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of dictator or recipient. Folowing standard instructions, dictators 
were asked to make a division of the pie (10 Euros) in integer numbers. he instructions (read aloud by the 
instructor) made subjects aware that keeping the whole pie was acceptable. Once the dictators had reached their 
decision, the recipients (n1 = 50) were privately asked to guess the donation they were going to receive. A scoring rule with monetary incentives motivated recipients to make accurate guesses: Subjects were paid 5 Euros for cor-
rect answers, 1 Euro if they failed by just one unit, and 0 otherwise. While the dictators made their decisions, the 
recipients (n1 = 50) were privately asked to guess the donation they were going to receive (Condition 1) as wel as the donation made by another randomly selected dictator in the room (n2 = 50, Condition 2). Order efects were controled for (i.e., half of them irst made the guesses for their own dictators). No order efect was found; 
the distribution of guesses of those recipients who estimated the donation of their dictator irst is not diferent 
from those who estimated other dictators irst (Mann-Whitney U or the t-test, p-values > 0.183). At the end one 
of the beliefs (Condition 1 or 2) randomly selected was paid out. Recipients received this amount in addition to 
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the donation of their matched dictator (see inal remarks). Subjects earned on average 8 Euros for the 30 minute 
session, including the show-up fee of 2 Euros.
Condition 3: Recipients in the field guessing own donations. This experiment was run at the 
Universidad Autonoma de Baja California Sur (UABCS) at La Paz (Mexico) in 2006. his location was chosen for 
two main reasons. First, to the best of our knowledge, no one had ever run any experiments at that location; there-
fore the whole population was completely inexperienced. Second, there was an interest in exploring the efect of 
“high stakes” on expected generosity. hus, the size of the surplus to be divided (200 pesos ≈ 15 US$, ≈ 14 Euros in 
2006) was enough to buy 25 beers at any canteen there at La Paz. his would have cost more than $50 in the US in 
2006 (this amount more than triples the standard pie of $10 in the DG). A total of 56 students were recruited the 
week prior to the experiment. On the day of the experiment, subjects waited in the central plaza of the school near 
the auditorium. Twenty-eight subjects were randomly selected as dictators (n3 = 28), while the remaining subjects were asked to wait for 15 minutes. Dictators received a package comprising a large brown envelope with another 
smaler white envelope inside, containing ten 20-mexican peso bils (200 pesos) and experimental instructions. 
Instructions stated that the money they wished to keep should be placed within the smal white envelope and 
then in their pockets. he money they wished to donate to the recipients waiting outside had to remain in the big 
envelope. When recipients were asked to come in, dictators let by the back door, making communication among 
them impossible. Each recipient was seated 2 meters away from the place where their particular dictator had been 
seated and let the big envelope. Recipients received the instructions that their corresponding dictators had let. It 
was explained that these instructions belonged to the previous participants and then read them aloud. Recipients 
were informed that they would deinitely receive the money in the envelope. hey could earn 80 additional pesos 
if they guessed correctly the number of bils in the envelope, 20 pesos if they failed by just one unit, and 0 addi-
tional pesos otherwise. Average earnings were 150 pesos (≈ 12 US$, ≈ 10 Euros) in this condition.
Condition 4: Recipients in the lab paired with absent dictators. A total of 27 students at the 
University of Granada were recruited by standard procedures in May 2008. When subjects arrived at the lab they 
found the experimental instructions and envelopes containing the donations of dictators of a previous experi-
ment54. Again, subjects were asked to guess the donation contained in the envelope using the same scoring rule as 
in Conditions 1 and 2. Recipients received this amount in addition to the dictator’s donation in the envelope. Data 
from this condition difers from previously colected data in that dictators were absent when recipients made their 
prediction (i.e., recipients did not see any dictator in the room, nor did they receive any information about them).
Condition 5: External observers guessing dictators’ donations. One week ater the experimental 
sessions ran in the LINEEX (see Conditions 1 and 2) 50 new subjects were recruited. hey received the instruc-
tions of the game (read aloud) in Condition 1 and were asked to predict dictators’ behavior, that is, donations 
to recipients in the experiment one week before. Participants were asked to guess the amount donated by a ran-
domly selected dictator. hey were informed that they would not receive the dictator’s donation. In line with al 
previous conditions, subjects were given incentives to make accurate guesses. he same scoring rule was used as 
before (5 Euros for a correct guess, 1 Euros if they failed by just 1 unit and 0 otherwise). he observations for this 
condition correspond to external observers. As in the case of Condition 2, this should alow us to explore the role 
played by involvement in the outcome.
Condition 6: Dictators guessing the donation of other dictators. Dictators in Condition 1 (n6 = 50) were invited to make a second decision ater dividing the pie. hey had to predict what another dictator in the 
same area had donated to his or her corresponding recipient. Again, we use the same scoring rule with monetary 
incentives (5 Euros if they are perfectly accurate, 1 Euro if they fail by one and zero otherwise) to motivate dicta-
tors to make accurate guesses. Dictators received this amount in addition to that which they decided to keep in 
the DG.
General comments for al conditions. Recipients in Conditions 1, 2, 3 and 4 were rewarded for their 
guesses, and received this amount in addition to the donation of their matched dictator. Although there is not 
much evidence for hedging strategies39, recipients may have incentives to hedge in these conditions. Clearly, 
hedging is not possible in Conditions 5 or 6, where dictators’ donations are not being received by guessers. It was 
decided not to use a payment scheme to avoid hedging in conditions 1 to 4 (e.g., paying recipients only once -i.e., 
either the dictator’s donation or one of their guesses) because it would imply deception against the dictator (who 
made a donation thinking that a recipient would receive the money).
Although we incentive beliefs in a quite standard manner, we acknowledge that our incentive scheme does 
not alow for eliciting the whole distribution of beliefs. Instead, we may be eliciting something closer to the modal 
expectation of subjects. In this regard, we could have used other methods for eliciting beliefs, which also come at 
the cost of making some assumptions; e.g., about risk preferences (for diferent methods and problems to elicit 
beliefs see refs 55–57).
Finaly, it was important that dictators make their decision about donations without knowing that recipients 
in the experiment would make guesses about donations, thus avoiding any strategic giving. Along these lines, we 
deliberately decided to elicit dictators’ beliefs ater they made their donation to eliminate any focusing inluence as 
asking subjects about others’ behavior before playing the DG might trigger pro-social behavior35.
Behavior across conditions. he critical diference between Conditions 1 and 2 is that the recipient should 
feel less involved in the later. Since they are not guessing the money they are going to receive but the donation 
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to a third person, less wishful thinking is expected. Using Conditions 1 and 2, we can therefore see if recipients 
overestimate (or underestimate) the amount of money they are going to receive compared with what they believe 
other recipients wil get. We can see if the fact of being involved in the outcome has some efect on expected gen-
erosity, as it is the case when dictators make donations for themselves or for others58,59. he intention of Condition 
3 is to assess the importance of the lab efect on expected generosity. Another interesting feature of this condi-
tion, apart from introducing high stakes, is that recipients received the instructions once dictators let the room. 
his is not the case with previous conditions, under which instructions are read aloud in front of dictators and 
recipients (i.e., in Conditions 1 and 2 some credibility issues are minimized). his issue is further explored under 
Condition 4, where recipients guess the donation of an absent dictator. It is important to emphasize that while 
wishful thinking remains intact in Condition 4 - since the subjects are recipients of the money- the social distance 
is maximized60 since the dictators who did the job were absent when recipients made their guesses. Interestingly, 
Condition 5 can be interpreted as an extreme variation of Condition 4. In both cases, the dictator is absent but, on 
top of that, subjects who make their guesses are not going to receive the dictator’s donation in Condition 5. Any 
wishful thinking is therefore eliminated. Note that hedging is not possible in this condition. Finaly, Condition 
6 provides us with new evidence: since these participants were dictators themselves and had already divided the 
pie, they may have felt that they had some property rights (i.e., “owing” “the game”) and therefore might be more 
likely to predict selish behavior. Because they were not receiving any donation, apart from what they decided to 
keep, dictators should not have sufered any wishful thinking either.
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Table1inthemaintextdisplaysthedistributionofexpectedbehavioracrossconditions.
TableS1belowpresentsanoverviewofthemainstatisticsineachcondition. Wecantest
whetheralguessescomefromthesamedistributionusingaKruskal-Walistest.Thiscannot
rejectthenulhypothesisofequalityofdistributionsatanycommonsigniﬁcancelevel,both
whenweassumethatguessesfromC1andC2areunpaired(p-value=0.199)andwhenwe
excludeanyofthetwoconditionsfromtheanalysis(p-values=0.173and0.287,whenwe
excludeC1andC2respectively).
WehaveperformedpairwisecomparisonsusingaMann-Whitneytest(aWilcoxonsigned-
ranktestforpairedsamplesisusedtocompareCondition1and2). Becausemultipletests
wereperformed,thep-values(reportedinTableS2)arecorectedtocontrolthefamilywise
1
erorrateusingtheHolm-Bonferonimethod(1,2). Theresultssuggestthattherearenot
statisticalysigniﬁcantdiferencesbetweentheunderlyingdistributionsofanytwoconditions
atanycommonsigniﬁcancelevel(p-values>0.305).
Inordertoassesswhetherornotexpectationsaboutgenerosityareaccurate,weneedto
comparethemwiththeactualbehaviorofdictators.Fig.S1displaysthedistributionofdona-
tionsinaltheconditions. Whileweobservethatdictatorsaregenerous,theKruskal-Walis
testsuggeststhatatleastonesamplestochasticalydominatesoneothersample(χ22=7.11,p=
0.028).PairwisecomparisonsacrossconditionsconﬁrmthatdonationsaresmalerinCondi-
tions3and4(p<0.021)indicatingthatdictatorsaremoreselﬁshwhenstakesarehighorthere
issocialdistance(3–5).Theseﬁndings,inturn,implythatsubjectsoverestimatethegenerosity
ofdictatorsintheseconditions,whiletheyarequiteaccurateintherestofconditions.The
p-valueswhencomparingthedistributionofguessesanddonationsusingtheMann-Whitney
testareasfolows.Condition1:p=0.844;Condition2:p=0.182;Condition3:p=0.0090;
Condition4:p=0.003;Condition5:p=0.322;Condition6:p=0.130.
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